

Discussion of “Global Bank Lending and Exchange Rates” by Becker, Schmeling, and Schrimpf

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Motivation

- Recent advances in international finance with imperfect financial markets (Maggiore 2022 Handbook Chapter)
 - to understand financial crises and the ensuing policy response (e.g., Quantitative Easing and FX intervention)
 - deviations from arbitrage (CIP deviations)
 - more generally the impact of capital flows on exchange rate

This paper:

- Banks' cross-currency lending flows affects FX
- Micro data and estimation with GIV
- Valuable evidence supporting this rising literature

Complete Market Benchmark


- Exchange rate is the SDF differentials

$$e_t = m_t^* - m_t$$

- No role for quantity and demand elasticity

A Model with Financial Frictions

- Gabaix and Maggiori (2015)



- Preference shocks generates international trade and capital flows

$$C_t = [C_{NT,t}^{\alpha_t} C_{H,t}^{\alpha_t} C_{F,t}^{\iota_t}]^{\frac{1}{\alpha_t + \alpha_t + \iota_t}}$$

$$\underbrace{\xi_0 e_0 - \iota_0}_{NX} + \underbrace{q_0}_{\text{financier position}} + \underbrace{f^*}_{\text{exo flow}} = 0$$

A Model with Financial Frictions

- Financiers intermediate capital flows and take expected excess returns, limited by the constraint

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{q_0} V_0 &= E\left[\beta\left(R - R^* \frac{e_1}{e_0}\right)\right] q_0 \\ \text{s.t. } V_0 &\geq \Gamma q_0^2 / e_0 \end{aligned}$$

- demand function: larger demand for higher expected return

$$q_0 = \frac{e_0}{\Gamma R} E\left[R - R^* \frac{e_1}{e_0}\right]$$

Implication 1: When foreign banks increase their lending in USD, the USD appreciates

- Exchange rate level

$$e_0 = \frac{(1 + \Gamma)\iota_0 + E(\iota_1) - \Gamma f^*}{2 + \Gamma}$$

- Trade (endowment, productivity, preference) shock $\iota_0 \uparrow$
 - RHS: US capital inflow, dollar lending is $q_0 \uparrow$
 - LHS: expected return on dollar $E[r - r^* \frac{e_1}{e_0}] \uparrow$, dollar depreciate $e_0 \uparrow$
- Exogenous flow for dollar $f^* \uparrow$
 - RHS: dollar lending is $f^* \uparrow$
 - LHS: financier dollar position $q_0 \downarrow$, expected return on dollar $E[r - r^* \frac{e_1}{e_0}] \downarrow$, dollar appreciate $e_0 \downarrow$
- Endogeneity (simultaneity): exogenous-lending and macro-driven lending have the opposite results

Implication 2: Tighter USD funding conditions amplify the effect

- Exchange rate level

$$e_0 = \frac{(1 + \Gamma)\iota_0 + E(\iota_1) - \Gamma f^*}{2 + \Gamma}$$

- Tighter USD funding conditions: larger Γ
 - low broker-dealer leverage

	Low Leverage	High Leverage
$\Delta\text{NCCL}_{c,t}$	78.29 (25.65)	-35.31 (76.72)

- low US bank reserve holdings
- low share of interbank loans granted to foreign banks
- a higher concentration of reserves among the major US banks

	Share of reserves		Share of loans to foreign banks		Reserve concentration	
	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low
$\Delta\text{NCCL}_{c,t}$	-68.43 (50.51)	98.69 (22.88)	-0.803 (48.34)	134.7 (38.17)	79.63 (29.88)	47.85 (34.43)

Implication 2: Tighter USD funding conditions amplify the effect

- Tighter USD funding conditions:
 - monetary policy cycles

	Fed Cycle		
	Hike	No Change	Ease
$\Delta\text{NCCL}_{c,t}$	100.9 (18.87)	21.20 (49.83)	-22.38 (144.7)

- Suggestion: policy rate levels
 - 6% to 5% (easing) is tighter than 1% to 2% (hiking)

Implication 2: Higher intermediation costs for FX swap providers amplify the effect

- f^* takes currency risk: short euro, long dollar
- For part of the lending, lenders swap the liability with a financier to short synthetic dollar
- Financier: long synthetic dollar, short dollar, subject to a constraint
- Pre-GFC, little constraint, dollar lending $\uparrow\uparrow$, $f^*\uparrow$, $e\downarrow$
- Post-GFC, large constraint, dollar lending $\uparrow\uparrow$, $f^*\uparrow\uparrow$, $e\downarrow\downarrow$

	Pre-GFC			Post-GFC		
$\Delta\text{NCCL}_{c,t}$	26.63	14.40	18.90	125.6	110.4	71.95
	(15.05)	(25.91)	(18.98)	(26.63)	(18.56)	(18.04)

Implication 3: Higher net lending flows should lead to larger CIP deviations

- Financier: long synthetic dollar, short dollar, subject to a constraint

$$f^{cip} = \frac{e_0}{\Gamma^{cip} R} \left[R^* \frac{f_0}{e_0} - R \right]$$

- CIP deviation $R^* \frac{f_0}{e_0} - R > 0$, widen with f^{cip}
- Endogeneity (reverse causality): Avdjiev et al (2019) triangular relationship:
 - LHS: dollar \uparrow , borrower risk \uparrow
 - RHS: dollar lending \downarrow
 - CIP deviations \uparrow

Comment: Convenience Yield

- Investors' utility

$$u(c_t, f_t^*) = \underbrace{w(c_t)}_{\text{utility from } C} + v(\underbrace{f_t^*}_{\text{USD bond}}; \underbrace{\theta_t}_{\text{demand shifter}})$$

- Exchange rate level (Jiang, Krishnamurthy, Lustig (2020))

$$e_t = -E_t \sum_{\tau=0}^{\infty} \lambda_{t+\tau} + E_t \sum_{\tau=0}^{\infty} (r_{t+\tau}^* - r_{t+\tau}) - E_t \sum_{\tau=0}^{\infty} rp_{t+\tau} + E_t \lim_{\tau \rightarrow \infty} e_{t+\tau}$$


- Convenience yield $\lambda_{t+\tau} = \frac{v'(f_t^*; \theta_t)}{w'(c_t)} > 0$
- Demand shifter $\theta_t \uparrow$
 - RHS: convenience yield $\lambda_t \uparrow$, lending in dollar $f_t^* \uparrow$
 - LHS: dollar appreciates $e_t \downarrow$
 - financier dollar position $q_0 \downarrow$, expected return on dollar $E[r - r^* \frac{e_1}{e_0}] \downarrow$, dollar appreciate $e_0 \downarrow$
- Question: how much is λ_t and how much is rp_t ?

Comment: Economics Magnitude

- The economic magnitude is useful to
 - policy practice (FX intervention)
 - discipline model parameters
- An increase in foreign banks' outstanding USD loans by 100 bp results in
 - an appreciation of the USD by 72 bp
 - an increase of CIP deviation by 2-4 bps
 - Avdjiev et al (2019): “a 1 percent appreciation of the broad dollar index is associated with a 2.4 basis point decrease in the cross-currency basis”
- “42.25bn USD additional net lending flow into the USD, leads to an appreciation of the USD by 36 basis points”
 - net exports 700 bn USD, appreciate 6%
 - GM: “the flow is comparable to 1 year worth of US net exports would induce the Dollar to appreciate 10%”

Comment: US Specialty

- The analyses are not specific to US
- Suggestion: consider variations in different currencies
 - interact $\Delta NCC L_{c,t}$ with CIP in currency c
 - countries with large negative basis (Japan) have a large elasticity
 - countries with positive basis (Australia) have a small elasticity



- Suggestion: consider net cross-currency bank lending in other currencies
 - segmented local currencies with illiquid swap: large elasticity and effect on CIP
 - global currencies: small elasticity

Comment: Instrument

$NCCL = \text{loan } c \text{ to } US - \text{loan } US \text{ to } c$

$$\Delta_{c,t}^{inflow} = \sum_{j \in c} \Delta l_{j,USD,t}^c \times w_{j,t-1}^c - \frac{1}{N_c} \sum_{j \in c} \Delta l_{j,USD,t}^c$$

$$\Delta_{c,t}^{outflow} = \sum_{j \in US} \Delta l_{j,c,t}^c \times w_{j,t-1}^c - \frac{1}{N_{US}} \sum_{j \in US} \Delta l_{j,c,t}^c$$

$$\Delta z_t = \Delta_{c,t}^{inflow} - \Delta_{c,t}^{outflow}$$

- Suggestion: consider $\Delta_{c,t}^{inflow}$ and $\Delta_{c,t}^{outflow}$ separately
 - USD elasticity may be different from c
- Suggestion: consider interbank loans granted to foreign banks in the US as Δl_j

Conclusion

- Highly recommend!
- A lot of new thought-provoking facts
- The results support past research and guide future research